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This paper identifies investor sentiment as an important driving force in the amplification 
of liquidity shocks. Using a firm-level vector autoregression (VAR) framework, I find 
that investors’ pessimistic sentiment amplifies the feedback effect between the tightening 
of funding constraints through mutual fund outflows and the stock market illiquidity. 
This finding stands up in the face of various controls for other factors that affect liquidity, 
alternative measures of stock market illiquidity and alternative proxies for investor 
sentiment. Furthermore, I find economically significant returns for liquidity provision 
during periods of pessimistic sentiment. Collectively, my findings support a role for 
investor sentiment in the formation of fragility in liquidity: a small funding shock to the 
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I. Introduction  
 
The liquidity spiral induced by the feedback effect between funding liquidity (i.e., the 
ease with which investors can obtain funding) and market liquidity (i.e., the ease with 
which asset is traded) presents a significant challenge for investors. The mutual 
reinforcement between funding constraint and the price impact of liquidations often leads 
to the sudden dry-up of liquidity in the stock market. For example, Brunnermeier and 
Pederson (2009) describe a mechanism in which negative funding shocks force 
speculators to de-lever their positions, leading to the dry-up of liquidity. In equilibrium, it 
is possible that a small funding shock to the investors can lead to a sharp reduction in 
stock liquidity.  
 
           In this paper, I proposes a behavioral amplification mechanism for the feedback 
effect between funding liquidity and market liquidity, using capital outflows as a proxy 
for shocks to funding available to mutual funds. Specifically, I analyzes whether investor 
sentiment influences the funding- market liquidity spirals and explores whether sentiment 
is a driving force in the amplification of liquidity shocks. Following Brunnermeier and 
Pederson (2009)), I use the term “fragility of liquidity” to refer to the elasticity of stock 
liquidity with respect to investors’ funding shocks. A stock’s market liquidity is more 
fragile if the same funding shock triggers a larger reduction in market liquidity. During 
market turmoil, financial intermediaries such as hedge funds and mutual funds face 
tighter financing conditions. These include both higher margin requirements (in the case 
of hedge funds) and an erosion of the capital base through net fund withdrawals from 
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mutual funds. I argue that investors’ pessimistic sentiment plays an important role in 
amplifying the market liquidity impact of funding shocks to investors, which I call the 
“fragility of liquidity”. I focus on the liquidity shocks induced by money outflows from 
open-ended mutual funds. Notably, my sentiment proxy is measured outside of the 
financial markets, as I use the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index 
(orthogonalized with respect to a set of macroeconomic variables). 
 
          My focus on the link between investor sentiment and the market liquidity impact of 
mutual fund outflows is motivated by the fact that investor sentiment, as proposed by 
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990), can be interpreted as capturing the 
correlated beliefs of uninformed noise traders that are unrelated to fundamentals (changes 
in the investment opportunity set, “rational” cash flow forecasts, interest rates, etc.), 
which  also refers to excessively optimistic or pessimistic cash flow forecasts (e.g., Baker 
and Wurgler (2006)). Investor sentiment is generally attributed to individual, retail 
investors (see, for example, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler, 1991). Since individual investors 
hold about 90% of total mutual fund assets (Da, Engelberg and Gao, 2011), mutual fund 
flows are generally seen as the ‘‘dumb money’’ that is subjected to individual investor’s 
behavioral bias (Brown et al., 2005; Frazzini and Lamont, 2008.)  
 
         Liquidity dry-ups occur because market participants engage in panic selling (a 
demand effect), or market making sectors withdraw from providing liquidity (a supply 
effect), or both. The role of investor sentiment can come into play at both the demand and 
supply of market liquidity. On the demand side, pessimistic sentiment can induce 
individual investors to pull money out of equity mutual funds simultaneously (Da, 
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Engelberg and Gao, 2011) and create correlated outflows. Open-ended mutual funds, 
though not leveraged as hedge funds, are extremely reliant on outside capital to fund its 
investment opportunities. Because most funds are evaluated against all-equity 
benchmarks, few maintain significant cash balances (see, for example, Coval and 
Stafford (2007)). When capital is in immediate demand, mutual funds without significant 
cash reserves have no choice but to sell holdings quickly, creating a demand shock for 
liquidity (e.g., Ben-Rephael, Kandel and Wohl (2011), Coval and Stafford (2007), Edelen 
and Warther (2001), Lou (2010)). By offering on-demand withdrawals, mutual funds 
expose themselves to investor actions that are affected by investor sentiments. The 
demand for liquidity calls for its supply. On the supply side, Kaniel, Saar and Titman 
(2008) document that contrarian tendency of individuals leads them to act as liquidity 
providers to institutions that require immediacy. In a sense, individuals act as the 
irrational market makers as modeled in Baker and Stein (2004). As these market makers 
are not formally required to continuously provide market-making services, their supply of 
liquidity could easily be withdrawn when they are pessimistic about the stock market. 
Furthermore, arbitrageurs know that noise traders are pessimistic today and there will be 
resale price risk caused by the possibility that noise trader will become even more 
pessimistic in the future (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman, 1990). Hence 
arbitrage capital moves slowly to take advantage of the irrational beliefs of sentiment 
investors. With a limited supply of liquidity in the market during a general crisis of 
confidence, this sudden reduction in liquidity accelerates the decline in asset prices and 




          Pessimistic investor sentiment can aslo amplify the impact of illiquidty on ouflows. 
According to Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2010) `s  strategic complementarities model,   
investor`s incentive to redeem money from mutual funds is increasing in the redemption 
by other investors. When sentiment is pessimistic, investors know that some other 
pessimistic investors are going to redeem their money. The investors who stay with the 
funds will bear the cost. This cost is higher for illiquid funds. Hence, funds that hold 
illiquid assets would experience larger outflows and illiquid assets would be more 
subjected to outflow-induced price pressures. Therefore, pessimistic investor sentiment 
can amplify the dynamic relationship between market liquidity and funding shocks to 
mutual funds.   
 
          To systematically test this prediction, I formulate various firm-level vector 
autoregressive (VAR) models. I start with the benchmark VAR model to investigate the 
dynamic interaction between mutual fund outflows and stock market liquidity. I examine 
mutual fund flows and stock market liquidity for the stocks traded in NYSE/Amex over 
the period 1991–2009. For each stock, I construct the monthly time-series of stock 
OutFlow to capture the percent of the shares of a given stock owned by mutual funds that 
is subjected to mutual fund outflows. The idea is that capital flows are from individual 
investors to mutual funds and then from mutual funds to individual stocks base on funds’ 
portfolio holdings. I use the Amihud (2002) price impact of trade measure to capture 
stock market liquidity. This measure is the absolute return divided by dollar trading 
volume. Thus it measures the price impact of trading. The higher is this measure, the 
higher is the price impact, and the lower the liquidity. This measure is consistent with 
theoretical research such as Grossman and Miller (1988) which defines liquidity based on 
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price impact as a result of buying and selling pressure. I also consider bid-ask spread as 
measure of illiquidity in my robustness checks. My benchmark VAR model includes 
three endogenous variables: OutFlow, illiquidity, and return as the benchmark model. I 
include return in the VAR system because previous studies identify an important relation 
of both mutual fund flows and illiquidity with stock returns. I control for any endogenous 
interaction with returns in all my analyses. I document a positive feedback effect between 
OutFlow and illiquidity.  
 
          I then proceed to estimate the VAR model with the presence of the interaction 
variable pessimistic sentiment. To ensure that my sentiment measure is free of 
macroeconomic influences, I conduct my investigation using the residual from the 
regression of the University of Michigan consumer confidence index on a set of variables 
that proxy for fundamental economic activities. Furthermore, I construct alternative 
sentiment measure by controlling for proxies for investor’s risk aversion, specifically, by 
further orthogonalizing the Michigan sentiment proxy to VIX. Finally, in my robustness 
checks, I also consider the alternative index for investor sentiment constructed by Baker 
and Wurgler (2006, 2007). I multiply the sentiment indexes by -1 and denote it as 
pessimistic sentiment. I discover a critical role for investors’ pessimistic sentiment in the 
mutual fund outflow-illiquidity relationship. Given an OutFlow corresponding to 1% of a 
stock’s market capitalization, a one-standard-deviation increase in pessimistic sentiment 
increases the impact of OutFlow on Amihud illiquidity from 19% to 50% standard 




         Finally, using a zero-cost contrarian investment strategy as the measure of the 
return to providing liquidity, I examine whether the return to providing liquidity depends 
on the state of investor sentiment and whether it is more costly to provide liquidity for 
stocks which are more fragile in liquidity. The return to providing liquidity is reflected in 
the temporary decrease in price accompanying heavy trading and the subsequent increase 
as prices revert to fundamental values (e.g.  Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006), 
Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan(2010).) The zero-cost contrarian investment strategy 
yields an economically significant return of 2.84% per month when conditioned on 
pessimistic sentiment states. This return to providing liquidity is much higher than the 
unconditional return of 1.93%. Furthermore, I condition the return from liquidity 
provision on the state of investor sentiment and the state of market returns, and find that 
the pessimistic sentiment combined with down market give rise to a monthly contrarian 
profit of 3.62%. This number is much higher than the 1.15% when the sentiment is 
positive in the down market. Finally, I find that the return to providing liquidity comes 
from the portfolio of stocks that are fragile in liquidity.  
 
           This paper contributes to the recent literature on the amplification mechanisms in 
liquidity crises. Numerous theoretical models point to liquidity shocks as a cause of 
financial crises. (See, e.g., Adrian and Shin (2008, 2010), Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009), Diamond and Rajan (2009), Froot (2009), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), and 
Krishnamurthy (2010)). During periods of financial crisis, a reinforcing mechanism 
between market liquidity and funding liquidity leads to liquidity spirals and fragility—a 
small shock can lead to a large jump in illiquidity. Literature has proposed several 
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illiquidity amplification mechanisms. For example, binding margin constraints 
(Brunnermeier and Pederesen (2009)) and the risk of experiencing future shocks, due to 
outflows (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)) can lead investors to liquidate their holdings 
simultaneously. During these episodes it is also hard to find potential liquidity providers. 
As Duffie (2010), and Duffie and Strulovici (2011) show, the frictions (such as the time 
to raise capital by intermediaries, the reputation concerns of fund managers and the 
delays in processing information) preventing buying capital to move quickly to 
temporary undervalued stocks are most significant during episodes of severe market 
turmoil.  A few empirical works focus on problems at hedge funds, which are thought to 
drive down stock prices as they respond to margin call with liquidation. Boyson, Stahel, 
and Stulz (2010) link hedge fund contagion in returns to liquidity shocks. Sadka (2010) 
shows that hedge funds with high exposure to liquidity risk underperform during liquidity 
crises. Aragon and Strahan (2011) argue that the failure of Lehman caused funding 
problems and losses at hedge funds that used it as a prime broker. All these studies 
assume investors at play are rational. The role of irrational investors in this illiquidity 
amplification mechanism, however, has not been a prime subject of inquiry. This paper 
fills this gap by investigating the role of investor sentiment in the illiquidity amplification 
mechanism. This paper also complements the empirical work by investigating a different 
channel for the feedback effect between funding liquidity and market liquidity, using 
mutual fund outflows as the demand shocks to funding liquidity.      
 
           Second, the evidence presented in this paper pertains to the emerging literature on 
the effect of investor sentiment on stock market outcomes. Baker and Wurgler (2006), 
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Brown and Cliff (2004), Lemmon and Portnaiguina (2006), Qiu and Welch (2004), and 
other papers have investigated the role of investor sentiment in stock market returns.   
Antoniou, Doukas and Subrahmanyam (2011) consider the impact of sentiment on the 
profitability of momentum strategies. Yu and Yuan (2011) show that sentiment has major 
effects on the mean-variance relationship in the stock market, with the tradeoff between 
risks and expected returns emerging only in low sentiment periods.  Baele, Bekaert, and 
Inghelbrecht (2010) discuss sentiment and the time-series relationships between 
government bond and stock market returns. Hwang (2011) provides evidence that a 
country’s popularity among Americans affects U.S. investors’ demand for securities from 
that country and causes security prices to deviate from their fundamental values. This 
paper contributes by providing evidence on the amplification effect of sentiment on the 
interaction between mutual fund outflows and stock market liquidity.      
 
The results in this paper also complement a number of studies on the price impact of 
mutual fund flows. Previous studies find that aggregate capital flows to mutual funds in a 
particular sector or in a particular investment style affect both the contemporaneous and 
the subsequent sector returns or style returns. (See, e.g., Warther,1995, Edelen and 
Warner,2001, Gompers and Metrick, 2001, Goetzmann and Massa,2003, Teo and Woo, 
2004). Coval and Stafford (2007) examine the price impact of extreme flows on 
individual stocks. Most of these studies focus on the impact of mutual fund flows on 
stock return. This paper indentifies liquidity as an important channel of the price impact 




         The paper outline is as follows: Section II describes the sample, data sources, and 
key variables. The methodology and results on impact of investor sentiment on the 
interaction of mutual fund flows and market liquidity are presented in Section III.  
Section IV investigates the cross sectional stock characteristics of fragility of liquidity.  
Section V examines the return from liquidity provision during different states of investor 
sentiments for different portfolios of fragile stocks. Section VI concludes.   
 
II. Data and Construction of Variables 
A. Investor sentiment index 
 
For the main part of the analysis I measure investor sentiment using the monthly time 
series of Consumer Sentiment Index constructed by the University of Michigan. The 
University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index 1  is measured using survey 
methodology. The survey is conducted on a sample of at least 500 households and the 
respondents are asked to answer about 50 core questions, which track consumer attitudes 
and expectations. The respondents are asked questions about their assessment of the 
current and future economic conditions.  
 
            The ICI Fact Book reports that in 2007, 86% of mutual fund assets in the USA 
were held by households. The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index 
directly captures households’ opinions on the financial and economic conditions. 
Consumer sentiment generally moves in line with economic variables such as interest 
rates, inflation and unemployment but sometimes it diverges from them. For example, 
                                                          
1
 Obtained from www. Sca.isr.umich.edu 
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consumer confidence plunged in August 1991, following Iraq’s invasion into Kuwait, 
beyond anything that could be predicted from economic conditions. In previous research, 
the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index has been used as a proxy for 
investor sentiment. For example, Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) use this measure to 
explain the cross-section of the 25 Fama_French portfolios. Fisher and Statman (2003) 
show that consumer confidence goes up and down with the sentiment of individual 
investors. Qiu and Welch (2004) show that Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index is one 
of the proxies that best capture the behavior of sentiment investors.   
 
           Since the consumer sentiment survey values reflect the consumers beliefs about 
the fundamentals of the economy as well as their over optimism or pessimism (investor 
sentiment), I remove the effect of fundamentals from the raw survey values. Specifically, 
I regress the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index on a set of variables that 
proxy for fundamental economic activities (Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006; Hrnjić and 
Sankaraguruswamy, 2010) as the following specification:  
 
     	 
   	    	 
   	 
3   	 
   	   	      	   ! 	                                                              (1) 
 
   is the original University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index. DIV is the 
Dividend yields, measured as the total ordinary cash dividend of the CRSP value-
weighted index over the last three months deflated by the value of the index at the end of 
the current month. Industry production growth rate (IP) is the quarterly change in the 
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natural logarithm of industry production. Default spread (DEF) is measured at a monthly 
frequency, and is the difference between the yield to maturity on Moody’s Baa-rated and 
Aaa-rated bonds, taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. YLD3 is the monthly 
yield on the three-month Treasury bill. GDP is the GDP growth measured as the 
quarterly change in the natural logarithm of adjusted GDP. Consumption growth (CONS) 
is measured as the quarterly change in the natural logarithm of personal consumption 
expenditures. Unemployment rate (URATE) is the monthly and seasonally adjusted 
values as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The inflation rate (CPI) is measured 
monthly and obtained from CRSP. Consumption-to-wealth ratio (CAY) is taken from data 
provided by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001).  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
I standardize the series to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The monthly index is 
plotted in Figure 1.    
B. Mutual Fund Data 
 
The mutual fund sample is constructed by merging the CRSP Survivorship Bias Free 
Mutual Fund Database with the Thompson Financial CDA/Spectrum holdings database 
using MFLink provided by WRDS. The CRSP mutual fund database includes 
information on fund returns, total net assets and other fund characteristics. Monthly total 
net assets are available for most funds from 1991. Hence the sample period in this study 
starts from 1991. The CDA/Spectrum mutual funds database includes all registered 
domestic mutual funds filing with the SEC. The holdings constitute almost all the equity 
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holdings of the funds. Most mutual funds in the database report their holdings on a 
quarterly basis; I adjust the holdings for stock splits reported in the CRSP stock files. 
 
 I require the ratio of equity holdings to total net assets to be between 0.75 and 1. The 
lower bound is to make sure that the equity portfolio accounts for a significant portion of 
the total funds` asset while the upper bound is to remove some apparent data errors. 
Summary statistics of more than 5000 mutual fund portfolios over the period 1991 -2009 
are presented in Table 1, Panel A. The average fund has Total net assets (TNA) of $914 
million over the sample period. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
C. Firm Level Mutual Fund Flows 
 
One important variable in this study is the firm level outflows: the percent of the shares 
of a given stock owned by mutual funds that is subjected to fund outflows. I first 
calculate mutual fund flows using the CRSP Mutual Fund Database. Since we do not 
observe flows directly, I infer flows from fund returns and TNA as reported by CRSP. Let 
"# be the total net asset of a fund k and let Rt be its return between month t -1 and 
month t. Following the standard practice in the literature (e.g., Zheng (1999), Sapp and 
Tiwari (2004), Frazzini and Lamont (2008)), I compute the flows for fund k in month t, 
$%&'()"#  using 
 




where /"#  is the increase in total net assets due to mergers during month t.  I handle 
mergers by assuming that investors in the merged funds place their money in the 
surviving fund. I assume that inflows and outflows occur at the end of the month, and that 
existing investors reinvest dividends and other distributions in the fund. I assign an initial 
TNA value of zero to funds that were newly created, while funds that die have outflows 
equal to their terminal TNA.  
 
         Following Frazzini and Lamont (2008), I assume that fund flows pass to stocks 
according to the existing holding portfolios of funds. This formulation assumes that all 
trades were made on the last day of the month. Thus, I have a formula for stock flow by 
fund k in month t: 
 
0(12'()3,"#  $%&'()"# 5 Proportion of stock in portfolio 2                          (3) 
 
 I then aggregate StockFlow over all mutual funds that experience outflow to create a 
total outflows for each stock i. For comparability among stocks, I scale the StockFlow by 
the market value ( /21BC3,") of each stock.   
 
$0'()3,"   ∑ EF"GH#IJGKL,MN EN 5OPIQRSIJGKMNTUVW#HXYL,M                                                              (4) 
 
Where 
P$%&'()"# Z 0V  is a dummy variable with the value of one when 
$%&'()"# Z 0  and zero otherwise.  




$0'()3,"   ∑ \]^_MN+]^_M`aN ,bcMN.+Wd M^N\5OPIQRSIJGKMNTUV]^_M`aN   5 eGJS3RfL,MNFgGQ"L,M#                  (5) 
 
h('&i%j3,"#  is the most recent reported number of shares of stock i hold by mutual fund k 
at month t. the Shout is stock i ‘s number of shares outstanding.  
 
       I also construct the firm level InFlow in the same way except  
P$%&'()"# Z 0V 
is replaced with 
P$%&'()"# k 0V. Firm level NetOutFlow is constructed as  
l0$0'()3,"   ∑ +m]^_MN+]^_M`aN ,bcMN.+Wd M^Nn]^_M`aN   5 eGJS3RfL,MNFgGQ"L,M#                                         (6) 
 
Figure 2 depicts the monthly firm level mutual fund OutFlow, InFlow and NetOutFlow .  
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
D.  Other Data and Variables 
 
Shares outstanding, stock returns, share codes, exchange codes , prices, market 
capitalization and trading volume  for all stocks come from the Center for Research on 
Security Prices (CRSP) daily and monthly files. In the current analysis, I focus on 
ordinary common shares of firms incorporated in the United States that traded on the 
NYSE and Amex. Throughout, ADRs, units, REITs, Americus Trust components, closed-
end funds and preferred stocks are excluded– that is, stocks that do not have a CRSP 
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share type code of 10 or 11. In addition, to be included in our sample, the stock’s price 
must be within $3 and $999. I exclude NASDAQ stocks because their trading protocols 
are different. The stock should also have at least 60 months of valid observations during 
the sample period. After applying all the above filters, the final database includes about 
4000 stocks over 19 years.    
 
         I construct the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure using the daily return, volume 
and price. The Amihud proxy is designed to capture the marginal impact of a unit of 
trading on the stock price. For each stock i for each month t, it is calculated as follows: 
''io3,"  O ∑ \cL,p\OGJqGJQrsL,pOSt                                                                                               (7) 
 
Where D is the number of days in month t. 3,S  is the daily stock return and 

('('$ul3,S is the daily dollar trading volume. Following Amihud (2002), I use the 
logarithmic transformation of illiquidity. Hasbrouck (2009) finds that among various 
price impact measures, the Amihud illiquidity measure has the highest correlation to the 
measures of price impact constructed from high-frequency data. 
 
Summary statistics of stocks over the period 1991 -2009 are presented in Table 1, 
Panel B. The stocks have average monthly return of 0.85% and average monthly 




III. Empirical Specification and Main Results 
A. Benchmark  VAR Model 
 
I start by examining the dynamic relationship between mutual fund outflows and the 
stock market illiquidity. To avoid imposing a priori restrictions on the dynamic 
interaction of outflows, illiquidity, and returns, I adopt a vector autoregression (VAR) 
methodology following Vagias and Van Dijk (2011). Vagias and Van Dijk (2011) use the 
VAR system with international capital flows, market liquidity and market return as 
endogenous variables to study the impact of international capital flows on local market 
liquidity.  
           The general form of an unrestricted VAR model of order p with m endogenous 
variables and exogenous factors is as follows: 
 
"    ∑ vJ 	 "+JYJt    	 w"  x"                                                                    (8) 
 
where "  Py,z, y,z, … , y|,zV´  is a m×T matrix of jointly determined dependent 
variables assumed to be covariance stationary, w"  Px,z, x,z, … , x~,zV´  is a  n×T vector 
of exogenous variables, A is a m×1 vector of intercepts, and vJ   P'  1,2, … , CV  and C 
are the m×m and m×n coefficient matrices to be estimated. In this paper, "  consists of 
three variables (defined for each stock i): monthly outflows of mutual fund investors 
weighted by their percentage holding of stock i ($0'()3,"), monthly stock returns (3,"), 
and the monthly Amihud illiquidity (''io3,"). I focus on the outflows instead of the net 
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outflows because inflows and outflows have asymmetric demand for liquidity. Detail 
analysis on inflows will be presented in Section III. C.  
 
Suppressing exogenous factors, the stock-specific VAR model can be expressed as 
follows: 
 3,"$0'()3,"''io3,"   
333  
3 3 33 3 33 3 3  
3,"+$0'()3,"+''io3,"+   
x3cx3Q"IJGKx3JJ3                         (9) 
    
  
 x3cx3Q"IJGKx3JJ3  ~m0, ∑3,    ∑3  




         Besides the endogenous variables, I include several external factors to control for 
other sources of inter-temporal variation in liquidity, return and mutual fund outflows.  I 
account for changes in market wide funding liquidity conditions by including the TED 
spread (the spread between LIBOR and U.S. Treasury bills). I also include market 
average returns as exogenous factors in the VAR specifications. 
           For each stock, I estimate the VAR model using the 5-year window rolled forward 
every 6 months. To decide upon the optimal lag length p, I use the Hannan-Quinn 
Information Criterion (HQC) for the firm-specific VARs. I find an optimal lag length 
equal to one month for the majority of the stocks. Consequently, for the sake of 
parsimony I use a lag length of one month in all VARs.  I require each regression has at 
least 40 observations.    
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Table 2 presents the results. Panel A reports the benchmark VAR model with only 
endogenous variables. Panel B reports the VAR estimation including exogenous variables. 
In Panel C, I exclude the 2007-2009 crisis period. The estimated coefficients are 
averaged over time and then across firms. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
        The coefficients 3   of the VAR model are the primary interest of this study. These 
coefficients describe the market liquidity impact of funding shocks, measured by mutual 
fund outflows. The coefficients  3  indicate that mutual fund outflows positively predict 
illiquidity for the stocks the funds hold. Furthermore, the OutFlow 
coefficients on  ''io  3  indicate the positive feedback effect of market illiquidity on 
OutFlow.    
 
          Returns display negative monthly autocorrelation, on average across the stocks 
after controlling the effects of outflow and illiquidity. The return coefficients on lagged 
illiquidity are positive and statistically significant. The evidence herein suggests the 
liquidity premium.  The results also resonate with Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010) 
that decrease in stock returns and market returns increases stock illiquidity. The 
coefficients on TED spread are positive and significant, indicating that market liquidity is 
negatively impacted by widening TED spreads, a factor that affects hedge funds and 
market makers` funding liquidity. 
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          To ensure that the results are not merely driven by the recent crisis period, I 
exclude the 2007-2009 time period in Panel C. The evidence in Panel C confirms the 
feedback effect between mutual fund outflows and illiquidity. 
Denoting the coefficient  3  from the VAR model as fragility of liquidity, I take the 
average of fragility of liquidity across stocks and plot the time-series variation of the 
average fragility in liquidity. Figure 3 shows significant time-series variation in the 
fragility of liquidity over the sample period 1995 to 2009. Recall that I estimate the VAR 
model with 5 years rolling windows, so the fragility of liquidity starts from 1995. We 
observe spikes in fragility associated with periods of liquidity crisis. For example, one of 
the spikes in the fragility of liquidity coincides with liquidity dry-ups during the subprime 
crisis (2007-2008) when investor sentiment is also very low. However, liquidity seems to 
be fragile during 1991-1995 even there were no crisis and we don’t see major mutual 
fund outflows. Interestingly, this period is accompanied by pessimistic sentiments, 
highlighting the impact of investor sentiment on liquidity.   
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
B. Investor Sentiment and the Fragility of Liquidity 
 
To directly examine how investors’ pessimistic (negative) sentiment affects the 
dynamic relationship between mutual fund outflows and market liquidity, I interact the 
three endogenous variables with the sentiment index,  
 




Where "= {R, OutFlow, Illiq}.  ljl%0"+ is the University of Michigan consumer 
sentiment index (orthogonalized with respect to a set of macroeconomic variables) 
multiplied by -1.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
         Table3 presents the results. The coefficients of negative sentiment interacting with 
OutFlow for the illiquidity equation measure the incremental impact of OutFlow on stock 
market illiquidity when investors’ negative sentiment is 1 SD higher than the mean.  
Given an OutFlow corresponding to 1% a stock’s market value, a 1 SD increase in 
negative sentiment leads to an additional 31% SD jump in illiquidity, from the 19% when 
sentiment is at its average. Pessimistic sentiment also amplifies the feedback effect of 
illiquidity on mutual fund outflows. The coefficients of negative sentiment interacting 
with illiquidity for the OutFlow equation are positive and significant. Overall, the 
empirical evidence strongly indicates that investors’ pessimistic sentiment amplifies the 
feedback effect between mutual fund outflows and stock market illiquidity. 
C. Asymmetric Effect of Inflows and Outflows on Liquidity  
 
In my analysis, I aggregate on mutual funds with outflows to construct the firm level 
outflows instead of netting out mutual funds with inflows because the asymmetric effect 
of outflows and inflows on liquidity. Brennan, Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Tong (2009) 
show that the demand for immediacy is stronger for sellers of securities than for buyers 
since investors are more likely to have a pressing need to raise cash than to exchange 
cash for securities. That say, mutual funds with outflows are forced to sell immediately, 
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while mutual funds with inflows, though tend to scale up their existing holdings (Coval 
and Stafford, 2007, Lou, 2010), are less urgent to do so.  
 
            To see how inflows affect the market liquidity for the stocks held by the funds 
and how investor sentiment affects this relationship, I run the VAR estimation replacing 
OutFlow with InFlow. 
   
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
          Table 4 reports the results. First, consistent with Coval and Stafford (2007), I find 
that the inflow-driven price pressure can also cause a decline in the liquidity of the stocks 
held by mutual funds. When many funds are simultaneously forced to buy the same 
securities and few others are willing to sell—this upward price pressure increases the 
demand for liquidity.  However, the magnitude of impact is much smaller compared to 
that of OutFlow. An InFlow corresponding to 1% a stock’s market value leads to a  0.4% 
SD jump in illiquidity, This finding is in line with Campbell, Ramadorai and Schwartz 
(2009) that institutions demand more liquidity when they sell than when they buy. Not 
surprisingly, pessimistic sentiment attenuates the impact of inflows on market liquidity.    
 
        Overall, the results suggest that both mutual fund outflows and inflows create the 
demand for liquidity. Nevertheless, investors’ pessimistic sentiment amplifies the mutual 
reinforcing effect of mutual fund outflows and stock market illiquidity, but attenuates the 
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impact of inflows on market illiquidity. These findings suggest that the impact of investor 
sentiment is most important when mutual funds face actual funding constraints.  
D.  Is the Sentiment Index Reflection of Investor Risk Preferences?  
 
One alternative explanation is that the sentiment measure is simply the proxy for changes 
in risk preferences of investors. Although traditional risk-based models do not appear to 
account for the sentiment effect on liquidity, this effect may still be related to some form 
of rational expectation if my sentiment measure reflects investor’s risk aversion, which 
determines investor’s required rate of return. In this section I construct my sentiment 
measure by controlling for a proxy for investor’s risk aversion. Specifically, I replicate 
the analysis in Table 3 by further orthogonalizing my sentiment index to VIX (the 
options-based volatility index).     
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
            Table 5 reports the results. As can be seen, the results remain essentially 
unchanged even when I orthogonalize the sentiment index with respect to VIX. For 
example, given an OutFlow corresponding to 1% a stock’s market value, a 1 SD increase 
in negative sentiment leads to an additional 23% SD jump in illiquidity. These findings 
suggest that the amplification effect of investor sentiment does not arise simply because 
my sentiment measure captures investors’ risk preferences.   
E. Sentiment or Volatility 
 
Theoretical models by Vayanos (2004) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) contend 
that market-wide volatility can affect both the demand side and the supply side of 
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liquidity. Furthermore, Huang (2012) shows that high expected market volatility is 
followed by larger fund outflows. Since market volatility affects both mutual fund 
outflows and illiquidity, volatility effects might dominate my findings. To address this 
concern, I run a horse race VAR model by interacting both the sentiment index and the 
VIX index with the three endogenous variables. Table 6 reports the results. The 
amplification effects of pessimistic sentiment remain.     
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
F. An Alternative Sentiment Index  
  
In this section, I examine the sensitivity of my results to an alternative index for investor 
sentiment, which is the measure constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007).  Baker 
and Wurgler (2006) form a composite sentiment index that is the first principal 
component of six measures of investor sentiment. The six measures are the closed-end 
fund discount, the NYSE share turnover, the number of IPOs, the average first-day return 
of IPOs, the equity share in new issues, and the dividend premium. To remove business 
cycle information, they regress each index on growth in industrial production, real growth 
in durable consumption, non-durable consumption, services consumption, growth in 
employment, and an NBER recession indicator. Their sentiment index is the first 
principal component of the residual series from the regressions.    
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
            Table 7 reports the Table 3 equivalent VAR estimation using the Baker and 
Wurgler sentiment measure in place of the Michigan Sentiment Index. All other variables 
remain the same as those in Table 3. The evidence in table 7 confirms the amplification 
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effect of investor sentiment on the feedback effect between outflow and illiquidity. 
Specifically, given an OutFlow corresponding to 1% a stock’s market value, a 1 SD 
increase in negative sentiment leads to an additional 48% SD jump in illiquidity. Similar 
results are obtained for the other coefficients in Table 3. These findings corroborate my 
previous results. 
G. Alternative Illiquidity Proxies  
 
In this section, I examine the sensitivity of my results using a couple of alternative 
illiquidity proxies.  
 
          Acharya and Pedersen (2005) point out that there are two problems using 
Amihud`s Illiq measure: First, Illiq is not stationary. Second, Illiq does not directly 
measure the cost of a trade. To address these concerns, I re-estimate table3 using the 
normalized measure of illiquidity according to Acharya and Pedersen (2005). The 
normalized measure of illiquidity is constructed as  
Illiquidity = min(0.25+0.3*Illiq* Pt-1,70), 
Where Pt-1 is the ratio of the capitalizations of the market portfolio at the end of month t -
1 and of the market portfolio at the end of July 1962. Illiq is the Amihud measure defined 
in Section II.D. To remove the extreme observations, I cap this normalized illiquidity at a 
maximum value of 70% instead of 30% as in Acharya and Pedersen (2005). The choice 
of 70% is to ensure that I will not remove the majority of observations in the crisis 




           Another alternative proxy for illiquidity I use is the proportional bid-ask spread (as 
a proportion of the stock’s price). Table 8 Panel B reports the Table 3 equivalent VAR 
estimation using the proportional bid-ask spread in place of the Amihud Illiquidity 
measure. All other specifications remain the same as those in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
          The evidence in table 8 using both alternative proxies for illiquidity further 
confirms the amplification effect of investor sentiment on the feedback effect between 
outflows and illiquidity.  
IV. Cross Sectional Evidence 
 
Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) show that broad waves of sentiment have greater effects 
on hard to arbitrage and hard to value stocks; these stocks will exhibit high sensitivity to 
sentiment. Do we expect these hard to arbitrage and hard to value stocks to be more 
fragile in liquidity? To examine the firm-specific determinants of the fragility of liquidity, 
I sort varieties of stock characteristics on the fragility of liquidity based on semiannual 
breakpoints. Table 9 reports the result. Smaller firms are more fragile, which is not 
surprising given that smaller firms usually have high retail concentration. The same 
category applies for stocks with low institutional and mutual fund ownership. Highly 
volatile stocks usually have high speculative appeal and hence relatively hard to value 
and relatively hard to arbitrage, making them especially prone to fluctuations in 
sentiment. The result shows that Volatile stocks are more fragile in liquidity. The number 
of analysts serves as a proxy for the mass of informed agents as suggested by Brennan 
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and Subrahmanyam (1995). Low analyst coverage stocks are hard to value and they show 
to be more fragile in liquidity.  Earnings surprises serve as the proxy for the extent of 
estimation uncertainty about fundamental values.  However, the result shows that stocks 
with high negative earnings surprises are more fragile than stocks with positive earnings 
surprises. A natural interpretation is that negative earnings surprises may indicate distress. 
 
 [Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
         However, results with respect to book-to-market do not seem to align well with 
hard to arbitrage and hard to value stocks, at least, at the first glance. Literature shows 
that growth stocks are usually more subject to sentiment shift. My finding shows that 
liquidity is more fragile for high book-to-market stocks. One possible explanation is that 
high book-to-market can also be associated with distress. Finally, young firms are 
difficult to value and they are found to be more fragile in liquidity. Overall, for the set of 
stocks for which sentiment is most likely to operate I find the impact of outflows on 
market liquidity the strongest. 
V. Contrarian Profit, Investor Sentiment and the Fragility 
of Liquidity 
 
Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2008) document that contrarian tendency of individuals leads 
them to act as liquidity providers to institutions that require immediacy. From models of 
risk-averse liquidity provision such as Grossman and Miller (1988) and Campbell, 
Grossman, and Wang (1993) that investors who require immediacy (e.g., institutions) 
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must offer price concessions to induce other risk-averse investors, in this case individuals, 
to take the other side of their trades.  However, these irrational market makers as modeled 
in Baker and Stein (2004) are not formally required to continuously provide market-
making services; their supply of liquidity could easily be withdrawn when they are 
pessimistic about the stock market. In pessimistic periods, small investors are less inclined 
to buy losers (Antoniou, Doukas and Subrahmanyam, 2011.) Therefore, the large returns 
demanded by the uninformed traders enhance price fluctuations, creating more risk in the 
positions liquidated than in those assets and increasing the premium demanded by other 
liquidity providers. Therefore, I posit that the expected returns from liquidity provision in 
equity markets rise during times of pessimistic sentiment. To construct a proxy for the 
returns from liquidity provision, I examine the extent of price reversals using the 
contrarian trading strategies that long on the loser securities and short on the winner 
securities. 
 
        I follow the contrarian strategy developed in Avramov, Chordia, and Goyal (2006) 
and applied by Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan(2010), except that I construct the 
monthly contrarian profit instead of the weekly ones. I sort the stocks in month t into 
positive and negative return portfolios. For each month t, returns on stock i (Ri,t) that are 
higher (lower) than the median return in the positive (negative) return portfolio are 
classified as winner (loser) securities. I use stock i’s turnover in month t (Turni,t) to 
measure the amount of trading. The contrarian portfolio weights of stock i in month t+1 
within the winner or loser portfolios are given by  




where Np denotes the number of securities in the loser or winner portfolios in month t.  
The contrarian profits for the loser and winner portfolios for month t+k are: 
Y,"b#  ∑ 3,Y,"b3,"b#^Y3t                                                                                          (12) 
 
Next, I take the difference in profits from the loser and winner portfolios to obtain the 
zero-investment contrarian profits. 
 
         I investigate the effect of investor sentiment by conditioning the contrarian profits 
on investor sentiment in the month of the portfolio formation. Specifically, I examine 
contrarian profits in positive (optimistic) sentiment states and negative (pessimistic) 
sentiment states.    
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
         Table 10, Panel A reports a significant contrarian profit of 1.93% in month t+1 (t-
statistic=3.81) for the full sample period. The contrarian profit becomes insignificant as 
we move to t+2. Since the contrarian profits and price reversals appear to last for at most 
one month, I limit the subsequent analyses to the first month after portfolio formation. 
Panel B of Table 10 shows that month t+1 profits in the negative sentiment month 
increase noticeably to 2.84% compared to profits of 0.94% in the positive sentiment 




       Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010) show that return to supplying liquidity 
increases following periods of large drop in market return. The period of pessimistic 
sentiment might also be the period of down market. To examine whether the high 
contrarian profit is merely the results of down market, I further condition the contrarian 
profit on both market return and sentiment.  I define down (up) market as the market 
returns over the previous month less (greater) than its sample mean. Consistent with 
Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010), contrarian profit is much higher in the down 
market then the up market, however, the effect of sentiment still exists. Panel C shows 
that the largest contrarian profit of 3.62% is registered in the period when investor 
sentiment is pessimistic and in the down market, compared to a profit of 0.94% when 
sentiment is optimistic in the same down market. In the up market, contrarian profit is 
2.07% in the pessimistic sentiment regime and 0.77% in the positive sentiment regime.  
 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
 
           As sentiment is an important driving force that amplifies the liquidity shocks. I 
posit that the return to providing liquidity shall be even higher for stocks which are more 
fragile in liquidity when sentiment is pessimistic. To test this proposition, I rank the 
sample stocks into terciles based on the Fragility of Liquidity measured as the β32 from 
the benchmark VAR estimation and construct the contrarian profit for each fragility 
tercile conditional on the sentiment index. Table 11 shows that the contrarian profit all 
comes from liquidity provisions to the stocks that are most fragile in liquidity when 
sentiment is pessimistic. The contrarian profit is statistically and economically significant 
at 2.85% (t-stat=2.51) for the stocks that are ranked in the highest tercile in the fragility 
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of liquidity when sentiment is pessimistic, but insignificant for all the other two fragility 
portfolios and for periods when sentiment is optimistic.  
VI. Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates the impact of investor sentiment on the mutual reinforcement 
between the tightening of funding constraints through mutual fund outflows and their 
impact on stock market liquidity. Using a VAR system with OutFlow, illiquidity, and 
return as endogenous variables, I first document the mutual reinforcing effect of mutual 
fund outflows and stock market liquidity.  I then show that when the investor sentiment is 
pessimistic, liquidity can be fragile, that is a small mutual fund outflow can lead to a 
large decline in market liquidity of the assets held by the funds.  The feedback effect of 
market illiquidity on mutual fund outflows is also enhanced when sentiment wanes. 
These empirical evidences confirm that investor sentiment plays a significant role as an 
amplifying mechanism of liquidity shocks. 
 
          Models of risk-averse liquidity provision suggest that investors who require 
immediacy must offer price concessions to induce other risk-averse investors to take the 
other side of their trades. I use the idea that short-term stock price reversals following 
heavy trading reflect compensation for supplying liquidity and examine whether the 
return from liquidity provision varies with investor sentiment. I find that, indeed, the 
return to providing liquidity is higher in periods with pessimistic sentiment. For example, 
contrarian trading strategies based on return reversals produce economically significant 
returns (2.84 % per week) during period of pessimistic sentiment. The findings still hold 
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after controlling for stock market return. I confirm Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan 
(2010), and show that investor sentiment has incremental power to explain contrarian 
profits after accounting for market returns. Finally, I find that the contrarian profits 
mainly come from portfolio of stocks with fragile liquidity when investor sentiment is 
pessimistic.   
 
Overall, my paper presents evidence supportive of the role of investor sentiment as an 
important driving force in the amplification of the liquidity spirals. Pessimistic sentiment 
not only increases the demand for liquidity by amplifying mutual fund outflows, but also 
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The Investor Sentiment Index is the residual from the regression of the University of 
Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index on a set of macroeconomics variables. The measure 



















1 Time Series of Investor Sentiment








Figure 2 Time Series of Firm Level Mutual Fund Flows 
The series are the equal-weighted average of the three variables for all stocks held by 




















































































































Figure 3 Time Series of Fragility of Liquidity from Baseline VAR model 
 
The fragility of liquidity is the equal-weighted average coefficients     from the 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics for the sample of mutual funds and stocks used in 
this paper. Panel A reports the summary statistics of Mutual Funds. The number of 
distinct mutual funds in the sample is 5533. TNA is the total net asset. Net return is the 
monthly mutual fund return after fund expenses. Panel B reports the summary statistics of 
the stock sample. The number of stocks is 4429. Return is the monthly stock return, 
Amihud illiquidity is the log transformation of monthly Amihud illiquidity measure times 
106. Bid-Ask spread is the month end Bid-Ask Spread scaled by month end stock price. 
OutFlow, InFlow and NetOutFlow are as constructed in section II. C. The sample period 






Variable Mean Median StdDev P5 P95 
Panel A: Funds 
Total Net Assets ($ millions) 914.26 121.10 4571.64 3.30 3286.23 
Net Return (% per month) 0.65 0.92 5.38 -8.23 8.32 
Avg. flow/TNA (% per month) 1.67 -0.02 12.65 -5.79 13.82 
 
     
Panel B: Stocks 
Return (% per month) 0.85 0.35 14.05 -21.31 23.91 
OutFlow (%) 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.33 
InFlow (%) 0.12 0.06 0.25 0.00 0.41 
NetOutFlow(%) -0.02 -0.00 0.43 -0.30 0.20 
Amihud Illiquidity 0.819 0.040 3.428 0.0003 4.134 








Table 2 Baseline VAR Estimation 
The table shows the unrestricted estimates for the first-order VAR model. 
 
 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3,"+$0'()3,"+''io3,"+   
x3x33x33 
 
I estimate the VAR model using the 5-year window rolled forward every 6 months. 3," is the monthly 
stock return, ''io3," is the log transformation of monthly Amihud illiquidity measure times 106, $0'()3," 
is   constructed  as $0'()3,"   ∑ E]^_MN+]^_M`aN bcMN+Wd^MNE5OPIQRSIJGKMNTUV]^_M`aN   5 eGJS3RfL,MNFgGQ"L,M#   
 
Where "#  and "#   are the total net asset and monthly return of mutual fund k, respectively. /"#  is 
the increase in total net assets due to mergers . h('&i%j3,"#  is the most recent reported number of shares of 
stock i hold by mutual fund k and  ($03,"   is a stock ‘s number of shares outstanding. 
P$%&'()"# Z0V is a dummy variable with the value of one when 
  $%&'()"#  "# * "+# P1  "#V * /"# Z 0 and zero otherwise. 
 
The table reports the cross section average ((t-statistics)) of time series mean. T-statistics (in parentheses) 
corresponding to the standard error of the mean. In Panel B, the TED spread and market average returns are 
added as exogenous factors. In Panel C reports the results excluding the time period 2007-2009.The sample 
period is from 1991 to 2009. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and*, 
respectively.   
 
Panel A  Benchmark VAR model 
 Return OutFlow Illiquidity R2 
Return Equation -0.036*** -0.044*** 3.320*** 0.10 
(t-statistics) (-27.30) (-10.16) (42.67)  
OutFlow Equation -0.009*** 0.645*** 3.311*** 0.27 
(t-statistics) (-11.14) (329.31) (36.85)  
Illiquidity Equation -0.093*** 1.177*** 0.789*** 0.46 
(t-statistics) (-27.39) (41.11) (676.38)  
Panel B  Benchmark VAR model with exogenous factors 





Return Equation -0.048*** -0.020 5.449*** -0.016*** 0.976*** 0.25 
(t-statistics) (-24.22) (-1.50) (19.62) (-15.81) (94.11) 
 OutFlow Equation -0.018*** 0.389*** 3.877*** 0.084*** -0.031*** 0.30 
(t-statistics) (-9.76) (113.06) (13.77) (63.80) (-4.14) 
 Illiquidity Equation -0.214*** 1.572*** 0.649*** 0.408*** -0.366*** 0.45 
(t-statistics) (-10.46) (4.21) (222.19) (13.19) (-3.19) 
 Panel C  Excluding 2007-2009 





Return Equation -0.047*** -0.017** 4.658*** -0.016*** 0.910*** 0.24 
(t-statistics) (-22.65) (-2.35) (20.96) (-15.05) (89.33) 
 OutFlow Equation -0.015*** 0.384*** 2.015*** 0.086*** -0.098*** 0.28 
(t-statistics) (-9.11) (107.52) (15.92) (61.57) (-19.14) 
 Illiquidity Equation -0.175*** 0.588*** 0.642*** 0.319*** -0.399*** 0.43 




Table 3 VAR Estimation with Sentiment Index 
 
In this table, I interact the three endogenous variables with the sentiment index.  
      	 "+   	 ljl%0"+  μ 	 ljl%0"+ 	 "+ 
 
 
Where Y= {R, OutFlow, Illiq}. The TED spread and market average returns are added as exogenous factors. The tables report 
the cross section average ((t-statistics)) of time series mean. T-statistics (in parentheses) corresponding to the standard error of 
the mean. 
 
  ljl%0"+   is the sentiment index multiplied by -1. The index is standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The 
















Return Equation -0.066*** -0.056*** 5.518*** -0.003*** 0.005* 0.021 -0.053 -0.016*** 0.979*** 0.34 
(t-statistics) (-30.63) (-5.71) (22.46) (-3.73) (1.82) (1.35) (-0.18) (-15.31) (95.98)  
OutFlow Equation -0.016*** 0.376*** 3.966*** 0.002*** 0.008*** -0.009* 5.572*** 0.085*** -0.060*** 0.38 
(t-statistics) (-8.75) (100.68) (21.30) (3.90) (3.40) (-1.75) (25.36) (67.31) (-11.15)  
Illiquidity Equation -0.126*** 0.638*** 0.655*** 0.038*** -0.063*** 1.059*** -0.057*** 0.286*** -0.373*** 0.52 
(t-statistics) (-11.94) (10.21) (207.64) (11.75) (-4.69) (15.23) (-13.32) (21.76) (-10.05)  
45 
 
Table 4 Inflow, Illiquidity and Sentiment 
 
In this table, I estimate the VAR specifications in table3, replacing $0'()3," with %'()3,".  %'()3," is constructed  as 
%'()3,"   ∑ \]^_MN+]^_M`aN ,bcMN.+Wd M^N\5OPUV]^_M`aN   5 eGJS3RfL,MNFgGQ"L,M#      
Where "#  and "# are the total net asset and monthly return of mutual fund k, respectively. /"#  is the increase in total 
net assets due to mergers . h('&i%j3,"#  is the most recent reported number of shares of stock i hold by mutual fund k and  ($03,"  is a stock’s number of shares outstanding. 
P$%&'()"# k 0V is a dummy variable with the value of one when $%&'()"#  "# * "+# ,1  "#. * /"# k 0  and zero otherwise. 
 
The sentiment index is multiplied by -1 and standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The sample period is from 
1991 -2009. T statistics (in parentheses) corresponding to the standard error of the mean. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level is indicated by ***, **, and*, respectively.    
 
 












-0.040*** 0.024*** 1.752*** 0.002*** -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.196*** -0.014*** 0.960*** 0.34 
(t-statistics) (-19.91) (11.41) (23.24) (5.08) (-6.29) (-3.34) (-3.26) (-19.71) (98.58)  
InFlow 0.052*** 0.626*** 2.208*** -0.003*** -0.005*** 0.028*** -0.719*** 0.051*** 0.450*** 0.39 
(t-statistics) (26.75) (172.05) (21.29) (-5.11) (-2.61) (7.84) (-11.13) (54.18) (62.36)  
Illiquidity 
-0.112*** 0.014*** 0.739*** 0.022*** -0.024*** -0.051*** -0.081*** 0.108*** -0.134*** 0.52 




Table 5  Sentiment Orthogonal to Macroeconomic Conditions, and VIX 
 
In this table, I estimate the VAR specifications in table3 with the sentiment orthogonalized to VIX. I regress the University of 
Michigan Consumer Sentiment index on VIX and a set of macroeconomics variables described in section II. A.  I use the 
residuals from this regression as the sentiment proxy.  
 
The sentiment index is multiplied by -1 and standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The sample period is from 
1991 -2009. T statistics (in parentheses) corresponding to the standard error of the mean. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level is indicated by ***, **, and*, respectively.    
 
 











Return Equation -0.062*** -0.022** 5.020*** 0.000 -0.020*** 0.038*** 0.102 -0.016*** 0.965*** 0.34 
(t-statistics) (-30.43) (-2.44) (21.70) (0.37) (-8.62) (3.01) (0.40) (-15.97) (95.84)  
OutFlow Equation -0.012*** 0.360*** 4.691*** -0.002*** 0.005** -0.028*** 0.352** 0.085*** -0.054*** 0.38 
(t-statistics) (-7.31) (104.16) (22.03) (-5.45) (2.43) (-7.11) (2.24) (68.54) (-9.80)  
Illiquidity Equation -0.158*** 0.595*** 0.656*** 0.023*** -0.029** 0.777*** -0.038*** 0.295*** -0.306*** 0.52 





Table 6 Sentiment VS VIX 
 
In this table, I run a horse race VAR model by interacting both the sentiment index and the VIX index with the three 
endogenous variables. The sentiment index is multiplied by -1 and standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The 
sample period is from 1991 -2009. T statistics (in parentheses) corresponding to the standard error of the mean. Significance at 























Return Equation -0.076*** -0.048* 4.456*** 0.000 -0.011*** 0.027 0.219 -0.030*** -0.029*** 0.127*** 5.258*** -0.004*** 0.192*** 0.34 
(t-statistics) (-19.12) (-1.85) (16.22) (0.41) (-3.77) (1.63) (1.11) (-42.59) (-6.78) (3.69) (17.67) (-2.96) (18.84) 
 
OutFlow Equation -0.027*** 0.501*** 1.750*** 0.003*** -0.003 -0.038*** 0.778*** 0.007*** -0.009*** -0.056*** 0.339** 0.064*** -0.068*** 0.43 
(t-statistics) (-7.81) (64.80) (7.63) (5.49) (-1.11) (-7.28) (7.17) (11.27) (-2.99) (-7.18) (2.10) (53.37) (-9.70) 
 
Illiquidity Equation -0.429*** 0.458 0.709*** 0.014 -0.098** 0.982*** -0.068*** 0.028** -0.214*** -0.488 -0.024*** 0.354*** -0.419*** 0.61 









Table 7 Alternative Investor Sentiment Index 
 
In this table, I estimate the VAR specifications in table3 with the monthly sentiment index constructed by Baker and Wurgler 
(2007), using trading volume (measured as total NYSE turnover), dividend premium, closed-end fund discount, number and 
first day returns in IPO’s, and the equity share in new issues. Because these variables are partly related to economic 
fundamentals, Baker and Wurgler regress each proxy against growth in industrial production, real growth in durable, non-
durable, and services consumption, growth in employment, and an NBER recession indicator, and use the residuals from this 
regression as the sentiment proxies. The overall sentiment index is the first principal component of the six sentiment proxies. 















Return Equation -0.063*** -0.037*** 5.101*** -0.000 0.023*** -0.070*** -2.315*** -0.020*** 0.932*** 0.33 
(t-statistics) (-23.04) (-2.68) (18.12) (-0.11) (5.07) (-2.62) (-5.97) (-16.41) (90.77)  
OutFlow Equation -0.009*** 0.385*** 3.785*** 0.011*** 0.001 -0.041*** 5.662*** 0.082*** -0.103*** 0.36 
(t-statistics) (-4.32) (84.54) (19.96) (14.89) (0.26) (-5.33) (23.57) (58.06) (-19.84)  
Illiquidity Equation -0.118*** 0.795*** 0.658*** 0.088*** -0.050** 1.649*** -0.119*** 0.216*** -0.300*** 0.52 






Table 8 Alternative Illiquidity Proxies 
In this table, I estimate the VAR specifications in table3 using the normalized Amihud illiquidity and the proportional bid-ask 
spread (as a proportion of the stock’s price) as the measures of liquidity.  
Normalized Amihud illiquidity is constructed as    
 Illiquidity = min(0.25+0.3*Illiq* Pt-1,70), 
Where Pt-1 is the ratio of the capitalizations of the market portfolio at the end of month t -1 and of the market portfolio at the 
end of July 1962. Illiq is the Amihud measure defined in Section II.D.  
NegSent is the University of Michigan Sentiment Index (orthogonal to macroeconomic conditions) multiplied by -1. The index 
is standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Panel A reports the results using the normalized Amihud illiquidity 
measure, and Panel B reports the results using the proportional bid-ask spread.  
























Panel A  Normalized Amihud Illiquidity as Measure of Illiquidity 
Return -0.070*** 0.004 0.040*** -0.035*** -0.016*** -0.007 0.156*** -0.002* 0.288*** 0.34 
(t-statistics) (-27.38) (0.31) (24.26) (-2.68) (-6.18) (-0.46) (3.07) (-1.73) (28.17)  
OutFlow -0.029*** 0.470*** 0.067*** 0.093*** 0.005* -0.039*** 0.032** 0.043*** -0.084*** 0.38 
(t-statistics) (-10.37) (85.97) (28.74) (8.55) (1.68) (-8.11) (2.06) (35.79) (-11.89)  
Illiquidity -0.666*** 1.222*** 0.850*** 0.037** -0.068 0.805** -0.075*** 1.005*** -1.271*** 0.52 
(t-statistics) (-10.15) (3.65) (211.85) (1.99) (-1.02) (2.24) (-13.58) (18.87) (-5.59)  
Panel B  Proportional Bid-Ask Spread as Measure of Illiquidity 
Return -0.060*** -0.041*** 0.117*** -0.003*** 0.001 0.057*** -0.042*** -0.010*** 1.043*** 0.35 
(t-statistics) (-24.71) (-4.71) (16.77) (-3.81) (0.44) (4.54) (-4.56) (-7.91) (94.18)  
OutFlow -0.011*** 0.405*** 0.183*** 0.004*** 0.009*** -0.019*** 0.056*** 0.099*** -0.025*** 0.39 
(t-statistics) (-4.60) (91.14) (19.61) (5.88) (3.35) (-3.63) (8.61) (59.79) (-3.82)  
Illiquidity -0.004* 0.148*** 0.467*** 0.006*** 0.004 0.083*** -0.017*** 0.101*** -0.078*** 0.34 




Table 9 Characteristics of Stocks with Fragile Liquidity  
  
This table shows the characteristics of stocks for fragility-sorted portfolios. The fragility of 
liquidity is the coefficients  3   from the benchmark VAR model. Number of Analyst is the 
number of analysts making a forecast for the firm‘s earnings, obtained from the I/B/E/S 
Summary File. Earning Surprise is the difference between realized quarterly EPS and the median 
forecast of quarterly EPS from  I/B/E/S Summary File , divided by the stock price at the end of 
the final month of the fiscal quarter for which earnings is being forecast.  
 
 Stocks are sorted into portfolios based on June or December fragility. T-statistics (in parentheses) 
corresponding to the standard error of the mean. The sample period is from 1991 to 2009. 






Low 2nd Quintile Middle 4th Quintile High High - Low 
Fragility -0.0471 0.0047 0.0267 0.1686 5.4336 5.4807*** 
 
(-4.16) (5.96) (5.23) (5.37) (10.41) (10.4) 
Book-to-market 0.4794 0.5109 0.5691 0.6164 0.7547 0.2753*** 
 
(66.64) (47.8) (48.94) (38.88) (30.94) (13.2) 
Volatility 0.0265 0.0257 0.0284 0.0311 0.0331 0.0067*** 
 
(34.06) (29.16) (32.69) (36.26) (40.49) (21.94) 
Idiosyncratic  volatility 0.0186 0.0177 0.0195 0.0214 0.0234 0.0048*** 
(15.14) (15.42) (16.49) (18.41) (27.82) (7.68) 
Institutional Ownership 0.6118 0.6383 0.5761 0.4803 0.3313 -0.2805*** 
 
(31.94) (34.2) (28.62) (30.43) (48.29) (-18.91) 
Number of institutions 180.50 142.72 90.57 57.24 28.78 -151.72*** 
 
(42.7) (35.42) (21.65) (20.34) (25.27) (-35.61) 
Mutual Fund ownership 0.1255 0.1266 0.1113 0.0892 0.0669 -0.0586*** 
 
(16.56) (15.25) (14.1) (18.22) (27.68) (-9.44) 
Size ($ bill) 4.2738 2.2036 0.8937 0.4387 0.1913 -4.0825*** 
 
(19.72) (29.91) (27.58) (30.14) (28.7) (-18.84) 
Number of Analyst 6.2977 5.1797 3.6179 2.6030 1.8036 -4.4941*** 
 
(62.17) (90.64) (44.5) (39.72) (63.89) (-38) 
Earning Surprise 0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0011*** 
 
(4.32) (4.68) (0.14) (-1.62) (-6.04) (-11.56) 
Firm age 28.5 28.0 22.7 21.0 20.4 -8.1*** 





Table 10  Contrarian Profits and Investor Sentiment 
Monthly stock returns are sorted into winner (loser) portfolios if the returns are above (below) 
the median of all positive (negative) returns in month t. Contrarian portfolio weight for stock i in 
month t is given by: 
  Y,3"  P3,"+$%3,"+V/  3,"+$%3,"+^Y3t  
 
where 3," and $%3," are stock i’s return and turnover in month t.  
The contrarian profits for the loser and winner portfolios for month t+k are: 
Y,"b#   3,Y,"b3,"b#^Y3t  
 
Panel A reports the unconditional contrarian profits for month t+k, for k=1 and 2. Panel B 
reports the contrarian profits conditional on investor sentiment. Pessimistic (Optimistic) refers to 
sentiment index of the portfolio formation month being below (above) zero. Panel C reports the 
contrarian profits for month t+1 conditional on investor sentiment and the market return. Down 
(Up) market is defined as the market returns over the previous month less (greater) than its 
sample mean. Newey-West autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
Sample period is 1991-2009. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
 
Panel A  Unconditional Contrarian Profits 
Portfolio Month 
t+1 t+2 
Loser 1.19% 0.23% 
Winner -0.75% 0.13% 
Loser minus Winner 1.93%*** 0.10% 
(t-statistics) (3.81) (0.22) 
Panel B  Contrarian Profits Conditional on Investor Sentiment 
Month t+1 
Portfolio Pessimistic Optimistic 
Loser 2.92% -0.73% 
Winner 0.07% -1.67% 
Loser minus Winner 2.84%*** 0.94% 
(t-statistics) (3.87) (1.35) 
Panel C  Contrarian Profits Conditional on Investor Sentiment and Market Returns 
Month t+1 
Portfolio 
Pessimistic  Optimistic Pessimistic Optimistic 
Down market Up market 
Loser 3.66% -1.20% 2.18% -0.35% 
Winner 0.04% -2.35% 0.11% -1.11% 
Loser minus Winner 3.62%*** 1.15% 2.07%** 0.77% 
(t-statistics) (3.67) (0.98) (1.90) (0.93) 
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Table 11 Contrarian Profits Based on Fragility of Liquidity and Investor Sentiment   
 
Sample stocks are independently ranked into terciles based on Fragility of Liquidity measured as 
β32 from benchmark VAR estimation. Monthly stock returns are sorted into winner (loser) 
portfolios if the returns are above (below) the median of all positive (negative) returns for each 
tercile portfolio of fragility of liquidity in month t.  
 
Contrarian portfolio weight for stock i in month t is given by: 
  Y,3"  P3,"+$%3,"+V/  3,"+$%3,"+^Y3t  
 
where 3," and $%3," are stock i’s return and turnover in month t.  
 
The contrarian profits for the loser and winner portfolios for month  t+k are: 
Y,"b#   3,Y,"b3,"b#^Y3t  
 
The table shows the contrarian profits for month t+1 conditional on investor sentiment for each 
fragility tercile. Pessimistic (Optimistic) refers to sentiment index of the portfolio formation 
month being below (above) zero. Newey-West autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics are given in 
parentheses. Sample period 1991-2009. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical 





 Fragility Terciles 
Sentiment Terciles 1 Terciles 2 Terciles 3 
Pessimistic 0.02% 1.90% 2.85%** 
(t-statistics) (0.02) (1.22) (2.51) 
Optimistic -0.99% 0.16% 0.30% 
(t-statistics) (-0.84) (0.21) (0.32) 
 
 
 
